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“Rather than serving in the U.S. Senate for almost 20 years, or having 
so many other wonderful life experiences, I could have served a longer 
sentence in prison for some of the stupid, reckless things I did as a teenager. 
I am grateful to have gotten a second chance—and I believe our society 
should make a sustained investment in offering second chances to our 
youth.” 1 
—Alan K. Simpson, U.S. Senator 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Any individual under the age of eighteen is considered a 
juvenile and is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.2 
Under this framework, a juvenile committing an offense is subject 
to an adjudication of delinquency rather than a criminal 
conviction.3 The juvenile court system4 adjudicates juveniles with an 
eye on rehabilitation, geared toward recognizing the “unique 
characteristics and needs of children.”5 The system is designed to 
 
 1.  Alan K. Simpson, A Sentence Too Cruel for Children, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 
2009, at A25, available at LEXIS. 
 2.  MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.101, subdiv. 1, 260B.007 (2012). An individual may 
be removed from juvenile court and certified as an adult for proceedings if that 
individual is at least fourteen years old and has committed an offense that would 
be a felony if committed by an adult. Id. § 260B.125, subdiv. 1. Juvenile is defined 
as “[a] person who has not reached the age (usu. 18) at which one should be 
treated as an adult by the criminal-justice system; MINOR.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 945 (9th ed. 2009). 
 3.  See MINN. STAT. § 260B.001, subdiv. 2; see also id. § 260B.245, subdiv. 1(a) 
(“No adjudication upon the status of any child in the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities imposed by conviction, 
nor shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of this adjudication, nor shall 
this adjudication be deemed a conviction of crime . . . .”). 
 4.  Unlike adult criminal proceedings, juvenile courtrooms are generally 
sealed to the public. Id. § 260B.163, subdiv. 1(c). Additionally, unless an exception 
applies, juvenile records are sealed to the public as well. Id. § 260B.171, 
subdiv. 4(b). Finally, even if a juvenile’s record is accessible under an exception, if 
an expungement is granted, the very nature of one makes the record inaccessible 
to the public. Due to privacy concerns over a juvenile’s judicial proceedings, 
significant research in the area of juvenile expungements has been limited. 
 5.  Id. § 260B.001, subdiv. 2; see also COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, JUVENILE 
RECORDS IN MINNESOTA 4 (2014), available at http://www.crimeandjustice.org 
/researchReports/Juvenile%20Records%20in%20Minnesota.pdf (“In contrast to 
adult criminal court, juvenile court was fundamentally rehabilitative, adopting a 
parens patriae doctrine, in which the state intervened as a child’s guardian, 
protecting a child from her own wrongdoings and those of adults around her.” 
(citing Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal 
2
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provide extensive judicial discretion over unlawful behavior that 
originates not so much from inherent criminality, but rather from a 
failed or underutilized social environment.6 Because of this, the 
courts function from the standpoint that there will at some point 
be a second chance for that juvenile. If nothing else, that juvenile 
has until the age of eighteen to stay out of the criminal court 
system. However, even if they have had no other brushes with the 
law, thousands of Minnesota youths are adversely affected by their 
juvenile adjudications.7 A juvenile’s delinquency adjudication can 
have far-reaching ramifications that are felt long after an individual 
has left the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
An adjudication can carry many collateral consequences,8 from 
the mere stigma9 of being a juvenile offender to cognizable 
hardships in obtaining housing, employment, and education.10 
Although various efforts are being introduced to counter the 
effects of collateral consequences on the large class of individuals 
with past adjudications or convictions, these measures are a “tough 
 
Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 286 (2008))).  
 6.  See COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 4. 
 7.  See id. Adjudications affect youth at the time of the offense, but as they 
age out of the juvenile court system and attempt to seek employment, housing, or 
education, adjudications can continue to have a very real adverse effect by 
preventing them from entering those markets as adults. 
 8.  See id. at 12 (“The term ‘collateral consequences’ is a catch-all used to 
describe the barriers that a person might experience due to a juvenile or criminal 
record.”). 
 9.  Some sociologists posit the social theory that stigma alone can be the 
barrier that keeps an individual out of the “normalized” larger group. See ERVING 
GOFFMAN, STIGMA 139 (1963) (“The stigmatization of those with a bad moral re-
cord clearly can function as a means of formal social control; the stigmatization of 
those in certain racial, religious, and ethnic groups has apparently functioned as a 
means of removing these minorities from various avenues of competition . . . .”); 
see also Prison and Beyond: A Stigma That Never Fades, ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2002), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1270755 (“This keenness to lock people up is 
matched by a complete lack of interest in them when they get out.”). Speaking of 
stigma, “A survey of employers in five large cities found that 65% would not 
knowingly hire an ex-convict,” adding that “[a]nother facet of the ‘tough on 
crime’ movement has been to exclude ex-convicts from certain kinds of 
employment.” Id. 
 10.  See Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An Overview of 
Criminal Expungement Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1331, 1333 (2005). While Geffen & Letze mention only housing and employment, 
the decision in J.J.P. expands that framework to include obstacles in the area of 
education. In re Welfare of J.J.P. (J.J.P. II), 831 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Minn. 2013). 
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sell” to legislators and judges when many jurisdictions have a 
“tough on crime” stance.11 Nevertheless, past offenders have at least 
one legal remedy in the form of expungement to alleviate the 
collateral consequences of a past adjudication. 
Expungements are a legislatively driven primary tool used by 
the judiciary to directly counter the effects of a past adjudication.12 
They are the court-ordered sealing of government-held criminal or 
delinquency records of an individual.13 Under Minnesota law, 
individuals who have committed juvenile offenses are entitled to 
petition for an expungement of any adjudication records held by 
the district court. If the petitioner’s request is granted upon a 
demonstrated showing of need,14 that individual is entitled to have 
that record erased as if the event never occurred.15 Theoretically, 
this should enable the petitioner to move forward in obtaining 
housing, education, and employment without the blemish of his or 
her past offense. However, as this note explains, under the recent 
Minnesota Supreme Court decision of In re Welfare of J.J.P., 
petitioners may not see the practical solutions the court intended 
to grant through the expungement process.16 
This case note begins with a short history of the juvenile justice 
system before examining the statutory framework and prior case 
law involving juvenile expungements.17 It will then focus on the 
details of the J.J.P. case, encapsulating both the Minnesota Court of 
 
 11.  One such effort is Minnesota’s “Ban the Box” measure, allowing 
Minnesota’s portion of the millions of Americans with past convictions a second 
chance at an opportunity for employment. See MDHR Offers Employers a Toolkit on 
Minnesota’s New ‘Ban the Box’ Law Signed by Governor Mark Dayton Today, OFF. 
GOVERNOR BLOG (June 5, 2013, 12:08 PM), http://mn.gov/governor/blog/the 
-office-of-the-governor-blog-entry-detail.jsp?id=102-62169. 
 12.  MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 6 (2012); Expungement in Minnesota, 
COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST., http://crimeandjustice.org/councilinfo.cfm?pID=100 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
 13.  See Expungement in Minnesota, supra note 12 (explaining that an 
expungement is not the “destruction of the records”). 
 14.  The test is one of balancing whether an expungement of the 
adjudicating order would “yield a benefit to the petitioner that outweighs the 
detriment to the public in sealing the record and the burden on the court in 
issuing, enforcing, and monitoring the expungement order.” J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 
at 270. 
 15.  Id. at 267 (citing Barlow v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 365 N.W.2d 232 
(Minn. 1985)). 
 16.  See id. 
 17.  See infra Part II. 
4
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Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court decisions.18 This note will 
argue that while the Minnesota Supreme Court may have intended 
to provide solid footing for expungements in the wake of the 
decision, the court failed to provide many petitioners actual relief 
under Minnesota Statutes section 260B.198, subdivision 6.19 This 
note will then analyze the implications of the J.J.P. decision on 
petitioners and address the gaps left by the majority decision as it 
relates to relief sought by a petitioner in the areas of employment, 
housing, and education.20 Finally, this note will provide suggestions 
for possible legislative reform to remedy the ineffectiveness of the 
current statute.21 
II. HISTORY 
A. History of the Juvenile Justice System 
The philosophy separating the juvenile justice system from the 
criminal courts has a deep, historical origin.22 One of the early 
shifts occurred in the late seventeenth century, as an emphasis on 
the Christian example of moral living began to transform family 
dynamics and childrearing.23 This emphasis on good childrearing 
gave way to a permissible intervention by officials into the privacy of 
the nuclear family.24 In fact, the “[p]ublic interest in nurturing and 
protecting children became the focal point during the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century.”25 This time period, known as 
the Progressive Era, saw the emergence of a wealthy, white upper 
class that was “fearful of social disorder and dismayed by the 
poverty, disease, and lawlessness of urban life.”26 This gave rise to 
various organizations with prescribed police powers whose mission 
was clear: to save poor and neglected children, or ones who had 
 
 18.  See infra Part III. 
 19.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 20.  See infra Part IV.A.2–3. 
 21.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 22.  See Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile Court in 
Minnesota—a Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 883, 
885–89 (2006) (tracing the lineage of the juvenile justice system from the Middle 
Ages to present day). 
 23.  Id. at 885. 
 24.  Id. at 886–87. 
 25.  Id. at 888. 
 26.  Id. (citing ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY 70 (1987)). 
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been involved in delinquent acts.27 Essentially, “[t]his world view 
prompted compulsory education laws, new schools and vocational 
institutions, restructured curricula, and restrictions on child labor. 
It also led to the establishment of the federal Children’s Bureau 
and . . . the creation of the first juvenile court in the United 
States.”28 
The first juvenile court was created in Chicago, Illinois, 
in 1899.29 During its formative years, the court was intentionally 
separated from the criminal system because the creators believed 
that “criminal statutes, which for hundreds of years had essentially 
viewed children as adults by the age of seven, were a total failure in 
deterring the criminal behavior of children.”30 
The juvenile justice system was formed with an eye toward the 
power of parens patriae,31 which was an extremely deliberate 
departure from the criminal courts. The founders of the system 
envisioned the judge “[s]eated at a desk, with the child at his side, 
where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and 
draw the lad to him.”32 Because of this insistency that children were 
not merely “miniature adults,”33 the courts developed this system 
separately to avoid the constitutional due process constraints 
required in adult court.34 
The first juvenile court statute in Minnesota was enacted 
in 1905, clearly reflecting the social movements occurring at the 
national level.35 Throughout the early 1900s, Minnesota kept pace 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 889. 
 29.  Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909). The 
juvenile justice system emerged out of the passage of the first juvenile court act in 
Illinois, which was formed through initiatives led by social reformers interested in 
such causes as prison reform, employment issues, women’s suffrage, and poverty 
law. See Walling & Driver, supra note 22, at 889–90. 
 30.  Walling & Driver, supra note 22, at 890–91 (citing MONRAD G. PAULSEN & 
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 1 (N. Corinne Smith ed., 
1974)). 
 31.  Parens patriae literally means “parent of his or her country” and as a 
doctrine refers to the state as a provider of protection to those unable to care for 
themselves. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). 
 32.  Mack, supra note 29, at 120. 
 33.  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2397 (2011). 
 34.  Jennifer Park, Balancing Rehabilitation and Punishment: A Legislative 
Solution for Unconstitutional Juvenile Waiver Policies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 786, 
791–92 (2008). 
 35.  Walling & Driver, supra note 22, at 896. Minnesota was one of the most 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss3/14
 
1164 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:3 
with the national struggle between this parens patriae philosophy 
and the growing trend toward due process requirements for 
juvenile courts.36 The Juvenile Court Act of 1917 forbade a juvenile 
adjudication to be considered a conviction of a crime,37 and in 
1922, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that “determinations 
of delinquency did not require due process because it is the ‘right 
of the state to step in and save the child.’”38 The philosophy 
surrounding the juvenile court system started to shift toward the 
middle of the twentieth century. 
One of the earliest acknowledgements that there may be 
constitutional questions regarding juvenile adjudications came in 
1957 with an article entitled Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, in which 
the author questioned what practical differences were present 
between the criminal and juvenile court systems if the outcomes 
were similar.39 Moments like this reaffirmed the state’s long-
standing commitment to treating juvenile offenses differently than 
criminal convictions—even with shifts of statutory language 
throughout the years away from a paternalistic core to more 
punitive in nature.40 
In the 1960s, advocates who feared that juvenile court 
proceedings placed children in a sort of purgatory—the possible 
loss of personal liberties without the presence of constitutional due 
process requirements—began to challenge the system.41 In a series 
of pivotal U.S. Supreme Court cases, due process requirements 
 
progressive states in the early 1900s in regard to its juvenile justice system. 
Id. at 900. 
 36.  Id. at 910–11. 
 37.  Act effective Jan. 1, 1918, ch. 397, § 21, 1917 Minn. Laws 561, 570 (“The 
adjudication of a juvenile court that a child is delinquent shall in no case be 
deemed a conviction of crime . . . .”). 
 38.  John M. Stuart & Amy K.R. Zaske, What Does a “Juvenile Adjudication” 
Mean in Minnesota? Some New Answers After a Century of Change in Juvenile Court, 
32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 919, 923 (2006) (quoting Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151 
Minn. 467, 469, 187 N.W. 226, 226 (1922)). 
 39.  See Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 
547, 550 (1957) (“If the result of an adjudication of delinquency is substantially 
the same as a verdict of guilty, the youngster has been cheated of his constitutional 
rights by false labeling. We cannot take away precious legal protection simply by 
changing names from ‘criminal prosecution’ to ‘delinquency proceedings.’”). 
 40.  See Stuart & Zaske, supra note 38, at 927 (noting the 1980s shift in 
statutory language from importance on rehabilitation to that of public safety).  
 41.  See Courtney P. Fain, What’s in a Name? The Worrisome Interchange of 
Juvenile “Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions,” 49 B.C. L. REV. 495, 501 (2008). 
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were largely instilled into the juvenile justice system,42 but even 
today juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial unless they are 
transferred to adult court and tried there.43 In In re Gault, the Court 
affirmed that “some due process guarantees could no longer be 
withheld from juveniles under the guise of offering juveniles 
rehabilitation instead of punishment,” and that extending these 
“due process requirements would not destroy the uniqueness of the 
juvenile court.”44 
Although the due process requirements that have been 
extended to juvenile courts cannot be displaced by state 
legislatures, the “jurisdiction and purpose of the court is at the 
mercy of legislative will and can be changed to address problematic 
social issues.”45 Over the years, due to increased rates of youth 
violence, combined with a “tough on crime” stance, the courts have 
been trending toward a more punitive stance. 
Between 1992 and 1997, state laws in forty-five states made 
it easier to transfer juveniles into the adult system, thirty-
one states increased the sentencing options for juveniles, 
and forty-seven states removed juvenile court confi-
dentiality protections, resulting in more public pro-
ceedings and greater access to juvenile records. Further, 
although in most states the juvenile court has original 
jurisdiction for all persons under the age of eighteen, in 
some states the juvenile court jurisdiction ends at ages 
fifteen or sixteen; juveniles in these states have not yet 
reached the age of majority but are categorically 
considered adults for the purpose of assessing criminal 
responsibility.46 
For instance, in recent years, courts across the country have 
increasingly held that juvenile adjudications can be used to impact 
sentencing during a subsequent adult conviction.47 The trend 
 
 42.  See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 
(1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).  
 43.  See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (“[T]rial by jury in the juvenile court’s 
adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement.”). 
 44.  Fain, supra note 41, at 502 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 27–28). 
 45.  Id. at 504. 
 46.  Id. at 504–05. 
 47.  See, e.g., United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190–91 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 
1032–33 (8th Cir. 2002). 
8
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toward recognizing juvenile adjudications for the purposes of 
sentencing enhancements for adult convictions suggests that they 
are equivalent to adult convictions, at least in reference to the 
argument that the juvenile justice system is ever-increasingly more 
punitive than rehabilitative. 
B. Juvenile Expungement Statute 260B.198 
Juvenile expungement requests are governed by Minnesota 
Statutes section 260B.198, subdivision 6: “Except when legal 
custody is transferred under the provisions of subdivision 1, 
clause (4), the court may expunge the adjudication of delinquency 
at any time that it deems advisable.”48 
The earliest incarnation of the juvenile expungement statute 
was in 1959.49 It read, “Except when legal custody is transferred 
under the provisions of subdivision 1, clause (d), the court may, 
within 90 days, expunge the adjudication of delinquency.”50 In 
1961, the legislature amended the statute to its modern phrasing.51 
In the span of these two years, the legislature removed the 
restrictive ninety-day window and gave the district court judge the 
discretionary power to make case-by-case decisions regarding 
juvenile delinquents.52 
In the fifty-two years since, the legislature has not amended or 
expanded the statute.53 The scarcity of cases interpreting the statute 
 
 48.  MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 6 (2012). Subdivision 1, clause 4 states 
that an expungement is applicable unless there has been a “transfer [of] legal 
custody by commitment to the commissioner of corrections.” Id. § 260B.198, 
subdiv. 1. 
 49.  See Act effective July 1, 1959, ch. 685, sec. 28, § 260.185, subdiv. 2, 1959 
Minn. Laws 1275, 1293 (amended 1961). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See Act approved Apr. 20, 1961, ch. 576, sec. 13, § 260.185, subdiv. 2, 1961 
Minn. Laws 1035, 1039. 
 52.  See id. An alternate reading of the statutory shift is plausible. Since the 
phrase “within 90 days” was deleted, and “at any time it deems advisable” was 
simultaneously added, the phrase may be strictly construed to be a technicality 
regarding time. However, this has not been the interpretation. Instead, the widely 
understood interpretation has been concerned with the district court judge’s 
discretion. 
 53.  Section 260.185 was repealed in 1999 and replaced with 
section 260B.198. See Act of May 11, 1999, ch. 139, art. 2, sec. 30, § 260B.198, 
subdiv. 5, 1999 Minn. Laws 567, 619 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. 
§ 260B.198 (2012)). Any revisions to the statute did not affect the subdivision 
9
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perhaps solidifies the fact that until J.J.P., there had not been a 
need. This is the extent of any statutory direction for petitioners 
seeking an expungement of their juvenile records. In contrast, the 
adult statute is robust and offers petitioners guidance on content, 
service, process, and other general requirements.54 In the past, this 
vagueness forced practitioners and pro se petitioners to rely on the 
adult statute.55 As this note will discuss, without legislative 
intervention, anyone seeking an expungement of his or her 
juvenile record will need to continue to rely on the adult statute for 
many of these procedural elements. 
C. Lack of Relevant Case History Before J.J.P. 
The lack of relevant case history predating J.J.P. is striking. 
Most challenges have been filed under chapter 609A in regard to 
the court’s inherent authority to expunge records.56 A district court 
has inherent authority to expunge its own records, so the question 
has been whether judicial inherent authority may extend outside 
 
concerning expungements and is therefore irrelevant in this discussion. 
 54.  See MINN. STAT. ch. 609A. The statute authorizes the district court to seal 
the records and prohibit any disclosure of their existence. Id. § 609A.01. It governs 
adult criminal offenses and convictions by juveniles who were prosecuted as adults. 
Id. § 609A.02, subdiv. 2. Standing in stark contrast to the court’s ruling in J.J.P. 
regarding section 260B.198, subdivision 6, criminal proceedings not resulting in a 
conviction are explicitly subject to consideration for an expungement. Id. 
§ 609A.02, subdiv. 3. An expungement of an adult record is by no means easy; 
rather, it  
is an extraordinary remedy to be granted only upon clear and 
convincing evidence that it would yield a benefit to the petitioner 
commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and public safety 
of: (1) sealing the record; and (2) burdening the court and public 
authorities to issue, enforce, and monitor an expungement order.  
Id. § 609A.03, subdiv. 5. The Minnesota Supreme Court decided a case affecting 
adult expungement requests under chapter 609A the same day as it decided 
J.J.P. II. See State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276 (Minn. 2013). 
 55.  J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 269 (Minn. 2013) (noting that the “district 
court applied the standards that govern expungement of adult criminal records 
under chapter 609A”). 
 56.  For an explanation on the difference between statutory and inherent 
authority, see Expungement Working Group, Continuation of Presentation from 
House Research and Senate Counsel, at 5:00, MINN. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES (Oct. 22, 
2013) [hereinafter Expungement Working Group Meeting #2], available at http://www 
.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/workinggroups/expungaudio.asp (statement of 
Kathleen Pontius, Senate Counsel at Minnesota Senate). 
10
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the judicial branch. The lack of precedent is due not only to the 
private nature of juvenile court proceedings,57 but may also be 
because juvenile expungements have been underutilized due to the 
lack of guidance under both the statute and case law.58 Most cases 
were routed as inherent authority cases, which provided limited 
relief because they addressed only judicial records.59 
III. THE J.J.P. DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In 2002, at the age of seventeen, J.J.P. broke into the Town 
and Country Golf Course in St. Paul, Minnesota and attempted to 
steal food and beverage items from the snack bar.60 Within two 
weeks, he was arrested for shoplifting a pair of shoes from a 
department store.61 The State charged J.J.P. with felony second-
degree burglary and misdemeanor theft, and he admitted to both 
charges.62 In September of that year, the Hennepin County District 
Court adjudicated him delinquent on both counts.63 
In 2007, J.J.P. was working both as a licensed emergency 
medical technician and firefighter while studying to become a 
paramedic.64 At that point, he filed a pro se petition requesting an 
expungement of any records held by the court.65 He did not, 
however, specifically request expungement of any records held by 
the Department of Human Services (DHS), the agency responsible 
for performing background checks for various state licensing 
 
 57.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.163, subdiv. 1(c), 260B.171, subdiv. 4(b). 
 58.  See Lindsay Davis, Minnesota Criminal Expungement Law: Current Law, 
Updates, and Alternatives, MSBA FAM. L. SEC., http://www.mnbar.org/sections 
/family-law/2012-13%20Notices/9-8-12%20Lindsay%20Davis%20Power%20Point 
.pdf. 
 59.  See Jane F. Pribek, Minnesota Courts Get Leeway to Expunge Juvenile Records, 
MINN. LAW. (Jan. 27, 2012), 2012 WLNR 28751582, for an example of how an 
expungement of judicial records does not affect all applicable criminal records 
held by state agencies. 
 60.  J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260. 
 61.  J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 262. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 263. 
 65.  J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 127. 
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needs.66 Based on this first request, the court granted J.J.P.’s 
petition for expungement but limited the order to “[a]ll official 
records held by the Fourth Judicial District Court–Juvenile 
Division, other than the non-public record retained by the Bureau 
of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), including all records relating to 
arrest, indictment or complaint, trial, dismissal and discharge.”67 
J.J.P. continued his studies to become a paramedic, and in 
2010, the college requested that DHS conduct a background check 
to determine whether he was qualified for the position under state 
law.68 Even though the district court had granted J.J.P.’s request for 
expungement of judicial records, the files held by BCA still existed 
and DHS therefore had access to them. Based upon this 
adjudication record, DHS “concluded that J.J.P. was barred from 
‘any position allowing direct contact with, or access to, persons 
receiving services from programs licensed by DHS and the 
Minnesota Department of Health.’”69 J.J.P. was disqualified from 
being a paramedic based upon DHS’s finding.70 
Later that same year, J.J.P. again filed a petition with the 
district court to expunge his executive branch records, “including 
those held by the BCA, DHS, and Minnesota Department of Health 
(MDH).”71 This time, J.J.P.’s petition was denied.72 The district 
court found that although Minnesota Statutes section 260B.198 
authorized it to expunge executive branch records, J.J.P. had not 
demonstrated a sufficient need for expungement as defined under 
Minnesota Statutes chapter 609A.73 J.J.P. appealed, focusing on the 
district court’s use of inherent authority language regarding 
separation of powers to deny the expungement of his executive 
branch records.74 
 
 66.  See MINN. STAT. ch. 245C (2012); J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 127. 
 67.  J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 262 (quoting the district court order). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 263 (quoting DHS background check results). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260. J.J.P. brought his initial petition pro se, but he 
enlisted the help of attorney Jon Geffen when he appealed.  
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B. The Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision 
Grappling with a case of first impression,75 the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals viewed J.J.P. as an overall challenge to whether a 
district court is authorized to expunge executive branch records 
under Minnesota Statutes section 260B.198, subdivision 6.76 Up 
until this point, the statute’s vague language that a court may 
“expunge [an] adjudication of delinquency at any time that it 
deems advisable”77 forced the district courts to rely heavily on the 
adult statute to govern juvenile expungement requests. J.J.P. 
provided the perfect opportunity for the courts to wrestle with this 
issue.78 
In addressing the overarching issue of whether the district 
courts could expunge executive branch records, the court analyzed 
three separate issues: whether an expungement order granted 
under section 260B.198, subdivision 6 applies to records held by 
executive branch agencies such as BCA and DHS, whether there is 
a separation-of-powers conflict in doing so, and whether the court 
may rely on statute sections 609A.01–.03 in determining whether to 
grant the juvenile expungement.79 
In deciding the first question, the court looked to statutory 
construction and legislative intent.80 By arguing a plain language 
interpretation of the statute—the legislature had not intended to 
restrict the meaning to limit expungements solely to judicial 
branch records—J.J.P. convinced the court that the broad language 
of the statute should expand the court’s authority in expungements 
rather than restrict it.81 
After deciding that the statute was unambiguous regarding any 
limitation or restriction that could keep the court in a case like 
J.J.P.’s from extending its expungement powers to executive 
branch records, the issue of statutory interpretation dissipated. Yet, 
 
 75.  Id. at 126. 
 76.  Id. at 128. 
 77.  MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 6 (2012). 
 78.  The factors of J.J.P.’s case were all favorable for this argument because 
J.J.P. committed a crime of nonviolence, it had been several years since the 
adjudication, he was on a professional career path, and he had no subsequent 
adjudications. See J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 127. 
 79.  Id. at 128–30. 
 80.  See id. at 128–29. 
 81.  See id. at 128. 
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statutory interpretation would have supported the court’s ultimate 
decision anyway82: 
[C]ourts presume that the legislature does not intend 
results that are “absurd, impossible of execution, or 
unreasonable.” If we were to construe section 260B.198, 
subdivision 6, as inapplicable to records held by executive 
branch agencies, juvenile delinquents could receive less 
expungement relief than some juveniles who are certified 
for prosecution as adults and criminally convicted. But . . . 
the legislature has authorized remedies for juveniles who 
violate criminal laws that are not available to similarly 
situated adults or certified juveniles. In light of this 
demonstrated intent to treat juvenile delinquents more 
favorably than individuals who are convicted of crimes, it 
would be absurd to construe section 260B.198, subdivision 
6, as providing less relief than chapter 609A.83 
The court concluded that delinquency records held by the 
executive branch agencies could be expunged under Minnesota 
Statutes section 260B.198, subdivision 6.84 
The court next looked at inherent and statutory authority to 
determine whether a separation-of-powers conflict existed.85 The 
question was never whether the court had the authority to expunge 
its own records under the judiciary’s inherent authority,86 but 
instead whether the court was required to exercise deference and 
restraint outside of the judicial branch “where statutes require that 
some of the records be kept open to the public.”87 
The court noted that inherent judicial authority over executive 
branch records should be used sparingly and with restraint “in light 
of the deference that courts . . . afford the other branches of 
 
 82.  See id. 
 83.  Id. at 129. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (noting 
that the judiciary’s inherent authority extends only to its “unique judicial 
functions”). 
 87.  J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 129 (citing State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 279 
(Minn. 2008)). One executive branch agency keeping abreast of changes in the 
law is DHS. DHS’s power to review criminal records is statutorily driven. See MINN. 
STAT. ch. 245C (2012). This thorough statute governs everything from who may be 
subject to a background study, when it might occur, what is required, the 
disqualifying offenses, and remedies after a denial. Id.  
14
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government,”88 but there is no separation-of-powers conflict if the 
power to expunge is statutorily driven.89 Under this analysis, the 
separation-of-powers conflict issue became much clearer.90 The 
court concluded that unlike using its inherent authority, there is no 
separation-of-powers conflict when the judiciary expunges a record 
pursuant to statutory authority in accordance with the authority of 
the executive and legislative branches.91 
Finally, the court addressed whether the district court’s 
reliance on Minnesota Statutes chapter 609A was proper in guiding 
the decision to grant a juvenile expungement.92 This chapter 
governs expungements of criminal convictions.93 The State argued 
that this chapter was properly used to govern the request for a 
juvenile expungement because it “provides the grounds and 
procedures for expungement of criminal procedures under 
[several statutes], or other applicable law.”94 The court narrowed in on 
the use of “criminal records” in the statute to determine that it was 
not intended to apply to juveniles unless the juvenile was tried as an 
adult.95 
The use of the phrase “criminal record” is significant 
because the legislature has determined that “[n]o 
adjudication upon the status of any child in the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall operate to impose 
any of the civil disabilities imposed by conviction, nor 
shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of this 
adjudication, nor shall this adjudication be deemed a conviction 
of crime, except as otherwise provided in this section or 
section 260B.255.”96 
 
 88.  J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 129. 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  DHS itself recognizes the court’s authority to expunge executive branch 
records. See MINN. STAT. § 245C.08, subdiv. 1(b) (noting that as long as proper 
service has been received, DHS will comply with a court-ordered expungement); 
see also In re H.A.L., 828 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (explaining that 
when proper service is effectuated, “it is then within the district court’s sound 
discretion to determine whether to order DHS to seal its records and effectuate a 
complete expungement”). 
 91.  J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 130. 
 92.  See id. 
 93.  MINN. STAT. § 609A.01. 
 94.  J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 130 (alteration in original). 
 95.  See id. (“This chapter provides the grounds and procedures for 
expungement of criminal records . . . .” (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609A.01)). 
 96.  Id. (alteration in original) (citing MINN. STAT. § 260B.245, subdiv. 1(a)). 
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This seems to be reaffirmed by the goal of the Minnesota Rules of 
Juvenile Delinquency Procedure, which state that the general 
purpose of the laws relating specifically to children is to “promote 
the public safety” by “developing individual responsibility for lawful 
behavior” while giving “children access to opportunities for 
personal and social growth.”97 Several dispositional options for a 
juvenile court again reaffirm that the system was designed with a 
different intent than that of the adult criminal court.98 For instance, 
the option of a stay of adjudication is statutorily available for 
juvenile offenders, whereas for adults in criminal cases it is not.99 
Regarding expungements, the statutes offer the juvenile courts 
more latitude for relief.100 
Ultimately, because the district court found that a juvenile 
adjudication is not the same thing as a criminal conviction 
resulting in a criminal record, applying adult criminal guidelines to 
a juvenile adjudication was improper.101 Instead, the court “must be 
guided by the principles that govern dispositional decision-making” 
in juvenile cases.102 The court of appeals shifted away from chapter 
609A to a new standard: the dispositional guidelines found in Rule 
15.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure.103 
Driven by the policy-based, rehabilitative focus of the juvenile 
court system, the court reversed and remanded the case to the 
district court,104 “concluding that the district court abused its 
 
 97.  MINN. R. JUV. DELINQ. P. 1.02 (“The purpose of the laws relating to 
children alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety 
and reduce juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive 
law prohibiting certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for 
lawful behavior.”). Compare this with the purpose of the Criminal Rules: “These 
rules are intended to provide a just determination of criminal proceedings, and 
ensure a simple and fair procedure that eliminates unjustified expense and delay.” 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 1.02. 
 98.  See MINN. STAT. § 260B.198; J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 131. 
 99.  See J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 131. 
 100.  See id. (noting that the statutory authority for juvenile expungements is 
largely unrestricted, unlike that for adults). 
 101.  Id. at 130–33. 
 102.  Id. at 132. 
 103.  J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 131; see MINN. R. JUV. DELINQ. P. 15.05; J.J.P. II, 
831 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 2013). Under the Rules of Juvenile Delinquency 
Procedure, the courts must balance the best interests of the child against the risk 
to public safety. MINN. R. JUV. DELINQ. P. 15.05. 
 104.  J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 133. 
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discretion in denying J.J.P.’s petition.”105 With that, the State 
appealed and the case moved on to the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled on whether the district 
court is authorized to expunge juvenile delinquency records from 
executive branch agency files.106 In doing so, it provided new 
guidelines for determining when a petition for expungement 
should be granted.107 
1. The J.J.P. Majority 
The court began its analysis by reviewing the statutory 
language of section 260B.198.108 The State argued that the phrase 
“adjudication of delinquency” should be narrowly construed to 
restrict the judiciary’s authority to court-held records, while J.J.P. 
argued that the phrase extends to all records “irrespective of their 
location.”109 The court reviewed both the statutory framework and 
the process of how records are disseminated from their point of 
origin in the judicial system to conclude that the phrase applies 
specifically and solely to the “court order that adjudicates the 
juvenile delinquent” and any reference to the adjudication in 
executive branch records.110 
In order to decide whether J.J.P.’s executive branch records 
could properly be expunged under the statute, the court wisely 
traced the path of a court record through the system to the 
executive branch agencies.111 With that understanding confirmed, 
 
 105.  J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 263. 
 106.  See id. at 262. 
 107.  See id. 
 108.  See id. at 263–64. 
 109.  Id. at 263–66. 
 110.  Id. (noting that the phrase “adjudication of delinquency” has an 
“acquired, special meaning . . . in the juvenile court system” and “plainly refers to 
a single event—an order—that adjudicates the juvenile delinquent”). 
 111.  The court recognized four delinquency records at issue in J.J.P.: law 
enforcement arrest and investigation records forwarded to BCA, records the 
district court forwarded to BCA, records BCA collected in its juvenile history 
record database, and records DHS obtained from BCA. Id. at 265. The court 
analyzed how each of these of these categories is governed and disseminated by 
the courts, providing much necessary illumination into the process. See id. 
at 263–66. 
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the court departed from the court of appeals’ ruling. In the J.J.P. 
majority opinion, the court found “no legislative intent to broadly 
extend” the judiciary’s ability to expunge executive branch files to 
all records and documents held by an agency.112 Whereas the court 
of appeals focused on not construing the vague statutory language 
in a fashion that would lead to results that are “absurd, impossible 
of execution, or unreasonable,”113 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
focused instead on the inability to read too broadly into the statute 
for fear of “add[ing] language to the statute that does not exist.”114 
The supreme court focused on an issue more specific than that of 
the court of appeals: whether the district court has the ability to 
expunge more than the order of adjudication from executive 
branch files.115 The court concluded that section 260B.198, 
subdivision 6 “does not authorize the district court to expunge 
other records in executive branch files that precede the order 
adjudicating the juvenile delinquent,”116 even though it solidly 
recognized that there is ample statutory authority to generally 
expunge records from executive branch agencies without invoking 
a separation-of-powers conflict.117 
The court next tackled the issue of whether the adult statutes 
in chapter 609A should guide the district court or whether another 
means would prove more beneficial in light of the rehabilitative 
aspect of the juvenile court system.118 The supreme court opined 
that the court of appeals incorrectly relied on Rule 15.05 of the 
Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure because an 
expungement is not an authorized disposition.119 Furthermore, the 
 
 112.  Id. at 266. 
 113.  J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting MINN. STAT. 
§ 645.17 (2012)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260. 
 114.  J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 266. 
 115.  Compare J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 266–67, with J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d 
at 128–29. The disparate analyses lead to the same question of legislative intent: 
how are the executive-branch records affected by an expungement? 
 116.  J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 267. 
 117.  Id. In addressing the potential for a separation-of-powers conflict, the 
court found that there is none. Specifically, it went further than the lower court in 
finding that there was statutory protection for both the court through section 
260B.198 and for DHS through section 245C.08 and that they worked together to 
establish legislative intent in regard to expungements of executive-branch records. 
Id. at 268–69. 
 118.  See id. at 269. 
 119.  Id. at 270. This is a correct finding, as a petitioner is not eligible for an 
expungement at the dispositional stage. An expungement hearing is a separate 
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Rules are an inappropriate guide to govern expungements, since 
the petitioner has typically aged out of jurisdiction by the time he 
or she is seeking the expungement.120 The court also recognized 
that it is inappropriate for chapter 609A to govern juvenile 
delinquency adjudications since they are not a “criminal 
conviction.”121 Therefore, the court was forced to design a new 
standard and concluded that the district courts should move 
forward operating under a new balancing test.122 This balancing test 
would give the district courts discretion when examining “whether 
[an] expungement of the order adjudicating the juvenile 
delinquent would yield a benefit to the petitioner that outweighs 
the detriment to the public in sealing the record and the burden 
on the court in issuing, enforcing, and monitoring the 
expungement order.”123 Specifically, the court noted that the judge 
should consider and weigh the petitioner’s interest in three crucial 
areas: education, employment, and housing.124 This has become a 
focus in post–J.J.P. expungement hearings. If a petitioner has not 
demonstrated need in one or more of these key areas, he or she 
may not have the request granted. 
Related to the new balancing test is an important shift in the 
burden of proof required under the new guidelines, as opposed to 
the adult statute previously used to guide the juvenile courts. 
Whereas chapter 609A requires the petitioner to produce clear and 
convincing evidence that he or she is benefited commensurate with 
the disadvantages to the public, the new guidelines only require the 
petitioner to “bear[] the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the benefit . . . outweighs the detriment to the 
public and . . . burden on the court[s].”125 
With this, the court set a new standard for petitioners seeking 
expungement of their juvenile records. However, the majority’s 
 
event and often requires the passage of time to demonstrate the necessary showing 
of need and rehabilitation. 
 120.  See id. 
 121.  Id. at 269–70. 
 122.  Id. at 270. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. The legal burden of proof is clearly different in the two analyses 
(juvenile vs. adult). Under the same set of facts, it would be easier to expunge a 
juvenile case than its equivalent in adult court. However, the adult statute and case 
rulings provide no limitations on what can be expunged should the district court 
judge decide the petitioner has met the burden of proof.  
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decision does not provide clarity because it does not offer 
petitioners practical relief under the law when the district court 
grants an expungement request. Justice Paul H. Anderson 
narrowed in on the problems created by the majority’s decision in 
his concurrence. 
2. The J.J.P. Concurrence 
Justice Anderson argued that the majority was too narrow in its 
holding to restrict the executive branch records solely to the order 
of adjudication.126 He rested on a plain-meaning analysis of the 
statutory language, particularly the words “adjudication” and 
“expunge,” to conclude that the goal of an expungement could not 
be fulfilled if the record is not completely eradicated.127 
To strengthen his argument, he used the Black’s Law 
Dictionary’s definition of “adjudication” to illuminate that it involves 
a “process,” which he felt would certainly entail a broader scope 
than simply the order of adjudication.128 He noted that the plain 
meaning of adjudication as noted in Black’s would necessarily 
invoke more than just the “final act in the legal process—here, the 
order adjudicating delinquency.”129 
Interestingly, the majority argued against adding words to the 
statute in order to conform to a desired result,130 but Justice 
Anderson argued just that in response.131 He said of the opinion, 
“For the majority’s holding to make sense, it must . . . take the 
Legislature’s wording—that courts ‘may expunge the adjudication 
of delinquency’—and change that to read ‘may expunge the order 
adjudicating delinquency’—thereby both substantively and substan-
tially altering the plain language of the statute.”132 
Anderson attacked the majority’s interpretation of the word 
“expunge” as defined both by Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary to suggest that even if the court’s 
narrow holding concerning adjudication was convincing, it would 
be counterproductive to the plain meaning of “expunge.”133 Thus, 
 
 126.  See id. at 271 (Anderson, J., concurring). 
 127.  Id. at 271–72. 
 128.  Id. at 271. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See id. at 266 (majority opinion). 
 131.  See id. at 272 (Anderson, J., concurring). 
 132.  Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 6 (2012)). 
 133.  See id. at 272–73. 
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going back to the statute, Justice Anderson concluded that the 
majority’s holding cannot “give effect to the plain meaning of” an 
expungement within the larger statutory framework.134 In essence, 
if a district court grants an expungement of executive branch 
records, the only way it works is to require all records to be 
“obliterated”135 as if the event “never occurred.”136 
At this point in the concurrence, Justice Anderson provided a 
helpful allegory.137 He explained what happens when milk or infant 
formula stains an item of clothing, noting that even though the 
garment is washed, once it is stored and put away, the protein and 
iron in the milk breaks down over time to cause the stain to 
reappear after a long dormancy in storage.138 He then asked 
whether any parent would consider that stain expunged under the 
common definitions of the word “expunge”: obliterated, utterly 
removed from existence, made as if it never happened.139 His 
answer was that the majority simply executed a surface scrub in 
defining the scope of an expungement, only to have the offense 
reappear because the “detritus of that stain remains clearly 
visible.”140 
The entirety of Justice Anderson’s concurrence is packaged in 
the idea that the majority’s holding is unsustainable.141 Notably, 
while the majority directs the State to address its concerns to the 
legislature,142 Justice Anderson rests assured that the legislature’s 
intent to begin with was that an expungement would cover the 
entire process of a juvenile’s adjudication and not simply the order 
of adjudication.143 
 
 134.  Id. at 273. 
 135.  Id. at 274. 
 136.  Id. (quoting Barlow v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 365 N.W.2d 232, 233 
(Minn. 1985)). 
 137.  See id. at 274–75. 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. at 275. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  See id. Justice Anderson provided other examples of his disagreement 
with the majority’s reading of the word “expunge,” notably concerning the 
existing statutory schemes. Id. 
 142.  See id. at 270 n.12 (majority opinion). 
 143.  Id. at 275 (Anderson, J., concurring). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision clearly changed the 
way expungements can be granted by the district courts. As stated, 
until the decision in J.J.P., the courts funneled most, if not all, 
requests through chapter 609A.144 Now, petitioners find themselves 
in a sort of “wild, wild west,”145 where Justice Anderson’s fears have 
already started to come to fruition.146 
Since the ruling, petitioners are finding that many questions 
are either left unanswered or simply created anew. For instance, 
what happens when a charge did not result in an adjudication? 
What can be done about the remaining records that were not 
erased? How is the petitioner to explain an adjudication to a 
potential employer who cannot see the adjudication, but can still 
see the arrest record? What are the effects on immigration? This list 
is far from exhaustive, yet it reinforces the need for legislative 
action. 
With J.J.P., petitioners “were hoping for clarity, but [they] 
don’t have it.”147 In response, attorneys are preparing to bring more 
expungement challenges because so many petitioners remain 
affected through a lack of concrete relief.148 What follows is an 
attempt to address a few of the more glaring questions left 
unanswered in the wake of J.J.P. 
A. The Impact of J.J.P. on Juvenile Expungement Law in Minnesota 
1. A Stay of Adjudication Was Not Meant to Stay! The Irony of 
J.J.P. 
Perhaps the most significant impact on this area of law is the 
lack of relief for any petitioner who was charged yet not 
adjudicated. Because the majority in J.J.P. narrowly concluded that 
“the phrase ‘adjudication of delinquency’ in section 260B.198, 
subdivision 6 means the court order that adjudicates the juvenile 
 
 144.  Expungement Law CLE, at 34:50, WM. MITCHELL COLL. L. (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://vimeo.com/72462138 (statement of Jon Geffen). 
 145.  Id. at 51:51. 
 146.  Id. at 50:16. 
 147.  See id. at 54:00. 
 148.  Telephone Interview with Jon Geffen, Att’y, Arneson & Geffen PLLC 
(Oct. 9, 2013) (discussing the fact that the legislature has looked into collateral 
consequences and expungements in the past without taking legislative action). 
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delinquent,”149 the lack of effect on anything else is devastating.150 
Additional documents that support an adjudication are outside the 
scope of relief as prescribed by J.J.P. because they precede the 
“determination by the juvenile court to adjudicate the juvenile 
delinquent.”151 There are many instances in which a juvenile may 
not see an adjudication. The juvenile court system is rehabilitative 
in nature, created to offer juveniles a second chance at redemption 
before they are subject to the criminal court system. After J.J.P., the 
juvenile whose case was either stayed or continued for dismissal—
where the charges were filed yet never prosecuted or were 
otherwise returned in the petitioner’s favor—now finds herself with 
a long-term record without any remedy by the courts when it comes 
to executive branch records. 
With a gaze toward the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile 
justice system, it would seem that the courts were not created to 
attach a “criminal” record to a juvenile delinquent, especially with 
an individual who was never adjudicated. “To get away from the 
notion that the child is to be dealt with as a criminal; to save it from 
the brand of criminality; the brand that sticks to it for life; . . . to 
protect it from the stigma,—this is the work [of the juvenile 
court].”152 To do otherwise is to undermine the legislative and 
judicial view that “what happens in juvenile court, stays in juvenile 
court.”153 Additionally, it begs the question of why two distinct court 
systems are still in use if the collateral consequences of each are the 
same. 
In ascertaining legislative intent, the courts should assume that 
the legislature did not “intend a result that is absurd, impossible of 
execution, or unreasonable.”154 The court in J.J.P. focused on 
legislative intent in the separation-of-powers argument between the 
courts and DHS, but failed to extend it to any other argument 
regarding statutory construction. Because legislative enactments 
should be interpreted to assume the statutes should be “effective,” 
the court erred when it concluded that the scope of a district 
 
 149.  J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Minn. 2013). 
 150.  Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 43:16 (statement of Jon Geffen). 
 151.  J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 266. 
 152.  Stuart & Zaske, supra note 38, at 922 (quoting Julian W. Mack, The 
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909)). 
 153.  Id. at 922–23. 
 154.  MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (2012). 
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court’s statutory authority to expunge an executive branch record 
is limited to the order of adjudication.155 
As the court of appeals and Justice Anderson correctly noted, 
limiting the scope of an expungement to the order of adjudication 
runs counter to legislative intent. Furthermore, without consulting 
a professional,156 a pro se petitioner with a record that contains a 
stay of adjudication will most likely have no idea that he or she is 
unable to find relief.157 This reinforces the need for legislative 
action on the subject. With the recent formation of the state’s 
Expungement Working Group and the call for legislative action by 
practitioners involved in juvenile expungements, legislative action 
 
 155.  See id.; see also Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643, 651 
(Minn. 2012) (“When construing a statute, we presume that the Legislature did 
not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable.”); Lewis-Miller v. Ross, 710 
N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. 2006) (“When interpreting legislative enactments, we 
must presume that the legislature intended its statutes to be ‘effective,’ and not 
‘productive of absurd . . . or unreasonable’ results.”); State ex rel. Beaulieu v. 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 624, 533 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1995) (“[T]here is a 
presumption that the legislature does not intend a result that is unreasonable.”); 
First Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. Comm’r of Taxation, 250 Minn. 122, 127, 
84 N.W.2d 55, 59 (1957) (“[The Minnesota Supreme Court has] no right to . . . 
attribute to the legislature an intent to produce an absurd and unreasonable 
result.”). 
 156.  There is strong evidence to suggest that many professionals lack the 
guidance to effectively practice in this area of law. The pro se expungement packet 
leads with a warning: “A petition for expungement is a complicated legal 
procedure.” JUVENILE COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST.–HENNEPIN CNTY., 
EXPUNGEMENT OF YOUR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY RECORD 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/4/Public/Forms/Juvenile_Expungement-
_Single_Case_Packet.pdf. Additionally, many practitioners’ websites are out of 
date. See infra note 157. 
 157.  The packet available through the district court still contains a blank 
template for two kinds of proposed orders: one for a “stay of adjudication or 
adjudication” and one for “no adjudication.” There is no explanation that a 
petitioner may no longer seek relief for a stay of adjudication when it comes to 
executive-branch records. See JUVENILE COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST.–HENNEPIN 
CNTY., supra note 156, at 12–15. Additionally, a Google search for law firms that 
assist petitioners in obtaining expungements leads to website expungement 
guidance that is either outdated or too vague to understand that a non-
adjudication cannot be expunged from executive-branch records under J.J.P. 
See, e.g., Expunging or Sealing a Juvenile Court Record in Minnesota, CRIM. 
DEF. LAW., http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/criminal-defense 
/expungement/juvenile-records-minnesota.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2014); 
Minnesota Juvenile Conviction Expungement, RECORDGONE, http://www.recordgone 
.com/minnesota/juvenile-conviction-expungement (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
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may indeed be imminent. However, it remains to be seen how far 
the legislature is willing to go in light of opposition from 
prosecutors, law enforcement, and state licensing agencies who 
have a valid interest in seeing more “tempered changes to [the] 
process.”158 These parties have a valid interest in sustaining the 
“continuous tension between the need to rehabilitate and the need 
to punish.”159 Judges seem caught in the wake of this decision as 
well, one stating to a petitioner, “I wish I could help you more, but 
I can’t.”160 Jon Geffen, attorney for J.J.P., notes that “any substantial 
change in the statute will have to come from the legislature because 
‘we have gone as far as we can with this issue in the courts.’”161 He 
also pushes for legislative action because the justices were 
“hamstrung by the language of the statute.”162 
2. The Current Effect of an Expungement on Records Available to 
DHS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court offered a “narrow . . . 
imperfect remedy” for expungement of records held by executive 
branch agencies.163 DHS is perhaps the agency in Minnesota most 
affected by the court’s ruling.164 When prompted, DHS is statutorily 
mandated to look at anything on a petitioner’s record that has not 
been expunged.165 As previously noted, the only portion of a 
petitioner’s record that may be expunged is the order of 
adjudication.166 
 
 158.  Patrick Thornton, Group Formed to Examine Expungement Changes, MINN. 
LAW., Oct. 14, 2013, at 20, 20, available at 2013 WLNR 25880659. 
 159.  Luz A. Carrion, Rethinking Expungement of Juvenile Records in Massachusetts: 
The Case of Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 331, 364 (2004). 
 160.  Thornton, supra note 158, at 20 (citing St. Paul attorney Lindsay Davis’s 
experience with judges). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 53:00 (statement of Jon Geffen). 
 164.  The supreme court limited its discussion to BCA and DHS records since 
those were the only records at issue in J.J.P. See J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 276 n.6 
(Minn. 2013). However, the court’s ruling suggests that the district court’s reach is 
not limited to these agencies. Id. at 267 (“[T]he district court has the authority to 
expunge any reference to that order in executive branch files, including in records 
collected by the BCA or reviewed by DHS.” (emphasis added)). 
 165.  See MINN. STAT. ch. 245C (2012). 
 166.  A juvenile court record may contain any of the following: the charging 
petition, summons, notice, charge, court appearance dates, detention status, 
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Practitioners whose clients have had an adjudication expunged 
pursuant to J.J.P. are finding that DHS is maintaining its statutory 
authority, stating that there is still enough data on the record to 
disqualify the client.167 DHS holds that its statutory authority under 
chapter 245C allows it to include the admission and findings from a 
juvenile court case when deciding whether to disqualify an 
individual.168 Therefore, according to DHS, the supreme court 
decision in J.J.P. does not affect the way DHS investigates a 
juvenile’s file.169 In essence, J.J.P. has failed if a petitioner who has 
successfully petitioned the court for an expungement finds no 
remedy because of the continued existence of and reliance on 
executive branch files containing everything but the order of 
adjudication.170 
There are valid counterarguments to the expansion of relief 
for collateral consequences of an adjudication. One counter-
argument is that while this may be an imperfect remedy, petitioners 
who are denied employment through an agency that relies on DHS 
to conduct background checks can simply go find another type of 
job. This argument underestimates the reach of DHS, as out-of-
poverty jobs are highly regulated by DHS.171 DHS must perform 
background checks on employees wishing to work in these 
regulated environments, including janitorial or housekeeping, 
maintenance, and other similar positions.172 In total, the Licensing 
Division of DHS regulates over 22,000 programs, which includes a 
number of facilities that require individuals willing to work in entry-
 
warrants, weapons used, commitment duration, dispositions, and detention stays. 
It also contains all documents filed by the court, all documents from the juvenile’s 
probation officers, and county home schools or detention centers. See id. 
§ 260B.171. This statute has been amended to preclude public access of 
electronically stored juvenile records. Act of May 22, 2013, ch. 109, § 1, 2013 Minn. 
Laws 1154 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 260B.171 (Supp. 2013)). 
 167.  Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 47:35 (statement of Jon Geffen). 
 168.  See Expungement Working Group Meeting #2, supra note 56, at 1:45:35 
(statement of Jerry Kerber, Inspector General’s Office). 
 169.  See id. 
 170.  This is notwithstanding DHS’s statutory authority to protect the 
vulnerable populations it works with. 
 171.  See Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 48:50 (statement of Jon 
Geffen); see also Background Studies, MINN. DEP’T HUM. SERVICES, http://mn.gov 
/dhs/general-public/licensing (follow “Background studies” hyperlink) (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2014) (stating that a background study must be initiated “before a 
person has access to clients or residents or belongings” (emphasis omitted)). 
 172.  See Background Studies, supra note 171. 
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level, out-of-poverty positions.173 DHS performs approximately 
270,000 background checks each year, which breaks down to about 
1100 per day.174 The agency disqualifies 8000–10,000 each year, and 
DHS admittedly “gets it wrong” about seven percent of the time.175 
This affects a large number of jobs and creates real obstacles for 
individuals with non-adjudications. 
Under chapter 245C of the Minnesota Statutes, DHS is 
authorized to conduct background studies using a preponderance 
of the evidence standard.176 In doing so, the agency does not 
require a conviction to disqualify an individual; it looks at the 
individual’s conduct to predict future behavior.177 At this point, 
DHS uses its statutory authority to make an independent 
determination of the likelihood of guilt by analyzing whether the 
facts of the case match the elements of the crime the individual has 
been accused of.178 Even if an individual was acquitted or otherwise 
found not guilty by a judge, DHS nevertheless investigates the 
matter to determine anew whether that individual is “guilty” 
enough to be barred from working in that system.179 
To complicate matters even more, the applicant’s only chance 
at clarifying his or her record is post-decision.180 Thus, DHS adheres 
to the practice of “labeling first,” then following with the right to 
appeal.181 Two important issues arise from this practice. First, 
employers are likely to choose another candidate if presented with 
 
 173.  MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., LICENSING HUMAN SERVICES PROVIDERS 
PROTECTS HEALTH, SAFETY, RIGHTS 2 (2012), available at https://edocs.dhs.state.mn 
.us/lfserver/Public/DHS-4743-ENG (noting the total number of programs is 
approximately 23,000). 
 174.  Expungement Working Group Meeting #2, supra note 56, at 38:30 (statement 
of Jerry Kerber, Inspector General’s Office). 
 175.  Id. at 58:00–1:04:00 (noting that individuals have the right to appeal 
DHS’s findings). 
 176.  MINN. STAT. § 245C.14, subdiv. 1 (2012). 
 177.  Expungement Working Group Meeting #2, supra note 56, at 55:45 (statement 
of Jerry Kerber, Inspector General’s Office) (noting that a decision is based on 
conduct, not conviction). 
 178.  See id. at 58:00. This can include accusations at various stages—it need 
not come from the court. 
 179.  Id. (reiterating that DHS may disqualify people based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, which aligns with its granted authority as stated in 
section 245C.14). 
 180.  See id. at 59:45. 
 181.  Id. at 1:05:00 (clarifying that in certain circumstances, the individual may 
be allowed to work during the appeals process). 
27
Puechner: No Clean Slates: Unpacking the Complications of Juvenile Expungem
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
2014] JUVENILE EXPUNGEMENTS AFTER J.J.P. 1185 
the complications of a DHS appeals process that can often take at 
least forty-five days.182 Second, and more importantly, the individual 
who was never adjudicated, or whose case was acquitted for another 
reason, is judged anew by the agency for employment 
consideration.183 This bears direct relation to the failure of J.J.P. to 
give relief to juveniles who were never adjudicated, which sheds 
light on the larger issue: that of the long-lingering stigma after an 
individual has been “released” from the court system. 
DHS does not support changing the existing law.184 The agency 
stands in opposition to some practitioners and judges, using J.J.P. 
to bolster its argument that the law is being appropriately 
interpreted.185 Jerry Kerber, the Inspector General for DHS, sees 
clarity in the court’s decision, noting that parties may not see the 
same clarity because they disagree with the outcome.186 There is 
validity to the adherence by DHS to its statutory authority because 
of the agency’s obligation to the people it is empowered to protect. 
This cannot be minimized in the conversation regarding 
expungements or collateral consequences in general. Whatever the 
interpretation of J.J.P. and its impact on expungements, the 
movement toward some sort of legislative reform is gaining 
traction, as seen through the formation of the Expungement 
Working Group. 
3. Other Issues 
Several issues will need to be addressed by the legislature 
before the judiciary can effectively act. These problems are 
practical in nature, and they affect every petitioner who seeks the 
remedy of an expungement. It is outside the scope of this note to 
address all of the issues facing petitioners as they move forward 
after J.J.P., but it is crucial for lawmakers and practitioners to 
 
 182.  See id. at 1:11:00 (statement of Rep. Carly Melin) (voicing concerns about 
whether employers would really “wait around” for the applicant to have a 
hearing). The disqualified individual has thirty days to contact DHS with a request 
for reconsideration. MINN. STAT. § 245C.21, subdiv. 2(a) (2012). After receiving 
the request, DHS has fifteen to forty-five days to respond, depending on the type 
of reconsideration sought. Id. § 245C.22, subdiv. 1. 
 183.  Expungement Working Group Meeting #2, supra note 56, at 58:00 (statement 
of Jerry Kerber, Inspector General’s Office). 
 184.  Thornton, supra note 158, at 20. 
 185.  See id. 
 186.  Id. 
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understand what those who seek an expungement face. Because 
J.J.P. both expanded and constricted juvenile expungements, the 
effects of the new ruling are just beginning to be felt.187 
One problem the legislature will have to address is what the 
consequences of an expungement might be on obtaining housing, 
employment, or on some other external pursuit such as 
immigration status.188 Because the court held that that a juvenile 
expungement can only include the sealing of the order of 
adjudication, arrest and various other records preceding the order 
may be discoverable by officials and others making decisions about 
a petitioner’s life. Those who know how to analyze an offender’s 
record can still easily infer that someone was adjudicated without 
seeing the actual order of adjudication.189 
Additionally, housing and employment sectors often utilize 
computer data brokers to run criminal background checks on 
applicants.190 For a fee, these data brokers will provide an employer 
or landlord a profile of the applicant that contains any criminal 
information, even if outdated. Because “[d]ata brokers are not 
[always] required to update their records,” “expungement orders 
 
 187.  See Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 47:22. The ruling expanded 
expungements in the sense that district courts are not limited to judicial-branch 
records. On the other hand, the ruling constricted who may be granted an 
expungement by limiting the remedy to only those individuals who were 
adjudicated.  
 188.  Aside from problems with DHS, maintaining juvenile records can have 
particularly adverse effects if the petitioner “later decides to pursue a career in the 
armed forces, law enforcement, politics, . . . [or] higher education.” Carrion, supra 
note 159, at 335. 
 189.  See Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 48:23. 
 190.  See Logan Danielle Wayne, The Data-Broker Threat: Proposing Federal 
Legislation to Protect Post-Expungement Privacy, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 253, 
253–55 (2012) (discussing the need to regulate the information private data 
brokers are able to obtain on an individual). In Minnesota, data brokers are 
regulated under Minnesota Statutes section 332.70. These private business 
screening services may obtain criminal records and disseminate only a “complete 
and accurate record.” MINN. STAT. § 332.70, subdiv. 2 (2012). Many adults are 
affected by their past adjudications even though not all juvenile records are 
disseminated to the public. Members of the Expungement Working Group 
expressed concern that these records, while regulated, are available to anyone who 
would pay the fee. See Expungement Working Group, Presentation on Expungements 
from House Research and Senate Counsel, at 24:30, MINN. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES 
(Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Expungement Working Group Meeting #1], http://www 
.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/workinggroups/expungaudio.asp (statement of 
Rep. Debra Hilstrom, Chairwoman, Expungement Working Group).  
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do not apply to non-government sources,” and there are currently 
few regulations to force data brokers to obtain only current and 
correct information,191 petitioners may find they are denied these 
opportunities even after an expungement.192 The expungement 
process is confusing to begin with, and clearly petitioners who are 
granted expungements are left with more than just an imprint of 
their adjudications. The only remedy is the one that Justice 
Anderson suggests: an alignment of the district courts’ reach in 
regard to executive branch records with the purpose of an 
expungement. 
Another issue is that of proper service. The court has 
made it abundantly clear that chapter 609A does not govern 
juvenile expungements,193 yet the current statutory framework 
is so vague that petitioners are still forced to rely on the adult 
statute for information regarding the proper timeframe and 
process for service.194 This directly affects an agency like DHS. 
 
 191.  Wayne, supra note 190, at 255. State-to-state regulations differ, but 
because data brokers gather information from multiple sources across state lines, 
there may be an increasing need for federal legislation. Data brokers in Minnesota 
are regulated. See MINN. STAT. § 332.70. The burden is on the individual to initiate 
correction of a false or outdated record. Id. § 332.70, subdiv. 3; see also Expungement 
Working Group Meeting #1, supra note 190, at 32:40 (statement of Matt Gehring, 
Legislative Analyst from House Research). 
 192.  See Wayne, supra note 190, at 263–66 (discussing the need to regulate the 
information private data brokers are able to obtain on an individual); Expungement 
Working Group Meeting #1, supra note 190, at 28:30 (statement of Rep. Mary Liz 
Holberg) (noting that there are problems with regulating what businesses can use 
against applicants because the information gathered by data brokers can come 
from sources not subject to legislation, such as newspaper articles). Ms. Holberg 
(and others in the group) recognized that it is unrealistic for legislators to “unring 
the bell,” or use a “magic eraser” to “erase any element of data around a bad time 
in somebody’s life.” Id.; see also Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 48:23. 
 193.  J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 269 (Minn. 2013). 
 194.  See Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 51:50. This packet instructs 
petitioners that agencies require service at least sixty-three days before the 
scheduled hearing date, that those agencies have sixty days to appeal after an 
order is issued, and that victims have the right to present an oral or written 
statement to the court. JUVENILE COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST.–HENNEPIN CNTY., 
supra note 156, at 5–6. Under the adult statute, victims have the right to be 
notified of the expungement hearing if they proactively expressed to the court or 
prosecuting agency the desire to be made aware if an expungement has been 
sought by the offender. MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.06, subdiv. 1a, 609A.03, subdiv. 4. 
Additionally, of note is that Minnesota Statutes chapter 609A requires sixty days 
service, not sixty-three. Id. § 609A.03, subdiv. 4. Still, since section 260B.198 offers 
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Section 260B.198 gives no direction on service—only indirect 
service through the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office. 
Therefore, it would be entirely plausible for pro se petitioners to 
miss that aspect of service if they were to pick up an expungement 
packet from the district court or download it from the Internet.195 
This self-directed packet provides an affidavit of service, yet only 
contains a pre-addressed contact for the Minnesota Attorney 
General, the attorney for DHS.196 This is not direct DHS service, yet 
without any statutory language in section 206B.198, petitioners 
have to trust that DHS will be indirectly served through its attorney. 
Without direct service, a district court judge is within her power to 
deny the request for expungement of executive branch records as 
held by DHS.197 DHS considers the statute very clear on this issue.198 
In line with J.J.P., the agency admits that, once granted, 
expungements do reach DHS, but only after two prongs are met. 
First, DHS must be directly served so that they are given an 
opportunity to respond. Second, the order that is issued granting 
the expungement needs to “specifically relate to them.”199 
This technicality issue is but one loophole in the statutory 
framework. Unless the legislature addresses section 260B.198, 
petitioners will continue to be forced to rely on chapter 609A, 
which procedurally speaking is counter to the stated objective of 
the ruling in J.J.P.200 Therefore, petitioners will have a difficult time 
 
no guidance on technical requirements and individuals were consistently 
deferring to chapter 609A before J.J.P., the inference can be made that 
chapter 609A is still controlling on these matters, even though the packet oddly 
requires sixty-three days service.  
 195.  See JUVENILE COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST.–HENNEPIN CNTY., supra 
note 156, at 5–6.  
 196.  Id. at 5, 11; OFFICE OF THE MINN. ATTORNEY GEN., ANNUAL REPORT 
REQUIRED BY MINNESOTA STATUTE SECTIONS 8.08 AND 8.15, SUBDIVISION 4 (2011): 
FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 23 (2012). 
 197.  DHS does not physically hold files, but consults BCA, which does keep 
files. 
 198.  See MINN. STAT. § 245C.08, subdiv. 1(6)(ii)(b) (“[T]he commissioner may 
consider information . . . unless [DHS] received notice of the petition for 
expungement and the court order for expungement is directed specifically to the 
commissioner.”). 
 199.  Expungement Working Group Meeting #2, supra note 56, at 1:16:00 
(statement of Jerry Kerber, Inspector General’s Office) (admitting that DHS may 
disagree with the court’s authority to issue the order, but is required to adhere to 
it and may appeal if it disagrees with the outcome). 
 200.  There is evidence to suggest that legislative reform in this area may be 
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positioning themselves for success unless they are aware of every 
intricate detail of the process. 
B. Suggestions for Possible Legislative Reform 
Reforming the existing expungement laws in Minnesota will 
undoubtedly be a daunting, complicated task. With the formation 
of the legislatively based Expungement Working Group, the task is 
closer than ever before. However, this is not the first working group 
formed to study the collateral consequences of criminal convictions 
and juvenile adjudications. In fact, legislators this time around are 
charged with considering findings from previous working groups so 
as not to re-create the wheel.201 
Expungements should never be granted lightly.202 With this in 
mind, the goal should be to eliminate some of the collateral 
consequences associated with juvenile adjudications in order to 
rehabilitate those individuals back into society.203 The ever-
increasing dissemination of criminal records through largely 
unregulated avenues makes any kind of regulation seem over-
whelming, but by focusing on controlling what is within reach, the 
task becomes more manageable. 
The most important objective after the J.J.P. ruling should be 
to provide the judiciary with language by which they do not feel 
“hamstrung.” The court has invited legislative action; in fact, it is a 
key element for change in this area of the law. When the juvenile 
justice system was formed, courts “did not envision themselves 
creating a criminal record for each delinquent that would follow 
him or her into adulthood.”204 Nor did judges intend to feel 
 
coming. State Representative Debra Hilstrom is the co-chair of a new working 
group charged with examining possible changes to the statute. See Thornton, supra 
note 158, at 1; Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 1:08:00 (discussing the 
formation of the Expungement Working Group to address the statutory issues). 
 201.  See Expungement Working Group Meeting #1, supra note 190, at 53:30 
(statement of Matt Gehring, Legislative Analyst) (citing CRIMINAL & JUVENILE 
JUSTICE INFO. POLICY GRP., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON BACKGROUND CHECKS 
AND SEALING OF CRIMINAL RECORDS (2008), available at https://dps.mn.gov 
/divisions/bca/boards-committees/crimnet/Documents/Background%20Checks 
%20and%20Record%20Sealing.pdf). 
 202.  Geffen & Letze, supra note 10, at 1335 (“Expungement is defined at law 
as an ‘extraordinary form of relief.’ It does not apply to every individual suffering 
the detrimental effects of a criminal history . . . .”). 
 203.  See Wayne, supra note 190, at 257. 
 204.  Stuart & Zaske, supra note 38, at 922. 
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restricted by the statute.205 In formulating a new statutory scheme, it 
is this author’s contention that the following guidelines should be 
considered. 
The juvenile requirements must be completely disentangled 
from the adult statute. The court made it abundantly clear in J.J.P. 
that chapter 609A is not to govern juvenile adjudications.206 
Therefore, the statute must be completely rewritten to stand as an 
independent statutory framework for juvenile expungements. 
Special attention should be paid to the requirements of the 
petition itself, which will have to be rewritten by the court system 
notwithstanding any legislative action. It should encapsulate all 
requirements for petitioners, including service, form, contents, and 
any limitations. Currently, judges are caught between J.J.P.’s 
interpretation of statutory authority under section 260B.198 and 
the forced reliance on chapter 609A for technicalities. Creating an 
independent framework will allow juvenile court judges to execute 
legislative intent while preventing petitioners from appealing a 
decision based on the forced reliance on chapter 609A. 
The legislature will need to consider the tension between 
petitioners’ interest in expunging their records, executive branch 
agencies’ need to protect the parties they serve, and law 
enforcement and prosecuting agencies’ responsibility in protecting 
the public. The Council on Crime and Justice has provided its 
suggestions for legislative reform concerning juvenile records: that 
“arrest records, expunged records, and juvenile records may not be 
requested or used for purposes of employment, housing, or 
licensing, or for acceptance into programs of post-secondary 
education.”207 Additionally, it suggests that Minnesota Statutes 
section 260B.198 be interpreted to extend to all juvenile records.208 
In stark contrast, the Minnesota County Attorneys Association 
wishes to maintain access to criminal records, holding that it is a 
“critical public safety function.”209 The Association rests on thirteen 
 
 205.  See Thornton, supra note 158, at 20. 
 206.  J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 269 (Minn. 2013). 
 207.  MARK HAASE, COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RECORDS RELIEF 
ACT SUMMARY (2013), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/docs 
/ChampionMelinHaaseCriminalRecordsReliefActSummaryCCJ.pdf.  
 208.  Id.  
 209.  MINN. CNTY. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, MCAA EXPUNGEMENT PRINCIPLES 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/docs/MNCoutnyAttorneys 
AssocExpungementPrinciples.pdf. 
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guiding principles to advise the legislature of its interests in future 
expungement law reform—pushing for expunged records to be 
sealed, not destroyed, so they can be accessible in the future.210 This 
would support the primary goal of protecting the public interest 
against the needs of individual petitioners who may recidivate at 
some point.211 
The legislature should write the statute in accordance with the 
language of J.J.P.—that is, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
benefit of an expungement to him outweighs the detriment to the 
public and the burden on the court—in order to guide the district 
courts in their evaluations of petitioners as distinct individuals. 
Some petitioners will meet this burden and others will not, just as 
some petitioners will be denied simply through their failure to 
serve the correct parties. However, a new statute must be 
constructed in such a way to give the petitioner who embodies the 
entire purpose of the expungement process the ability to find 
actual relief. It would behoove the Minnesota legislature to once 
again be “in the vanguard of the reform trends”212 as the nation 
deals with the impact of saddling its youth with records that can 
prevent them from becoming productive members of society. 
All parties are interested in a fair, predictable, and impartial 
process, consistent between all Minnesota courts and individual 
petitioners’ cases. Even the Minnesota County Attorneys 
Association supports automatic judicial expungements for 
petitioners in certain situations where charges were either 
dismissed or where the case was decided in favor of the 
petitioner.213 This is one area on which the legislature can focus its 
attention in an effort to improve judicial efficiency, especially in 
the case of juvenile records. While the legislature is in a prime 
position to decide whether to address the gaps left by J.J.P., it 
 
 210.  See id. at 1–2. Multiple principles address the availability of post-
expungement records to affected agencies. 
 211.  This is a nebulous equation. There are certainly petitioners who 
recidivate and the public interest can therefore be harmed by the expungement of 
these prior records. However, the expungement process is designed to assist those 
people who have demonstrated positive, forward movement in their lives. The 
assumption underlying expungement reform should not be that all petitioners 
would at some point recidivate. 
 212.  Walling & Driver, supra note 22, at 900. 
 213.  The Association does not support the expungement of executive branch 
records. MINN. CNTY. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 209, at 4. 
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should be mindful of the particular mission of the juvenile justice 
system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The materialization of the court’s decision in J.J.P. has 
resulted in consequences that the court might not have anticipated. 
The mere fact that the majority addressed the plain meaning of 
the word “expunge,” recognizing that it indeed means to “erase 
or destroy,” conveys that the court’s intention was to deliver 
a clear solution under the juvenile expungement statute 
section 260B.198.214 However, in light of the court’s decision to 
limit an expungement to the “order of adjudication” instead of the 
entire process of adjudication as acknowledged by Justice Anderson 
in his concurrence, the real-life impact is to deny petitioners the 
relief the court is statutorily empowered to give. The combination 
of confusion concerning the law in this area and the way in which 
records are disseminated makes obtaining effective relief 
difficult.215 
The biggest problem with the majority ruling is that it fails to 
give relief at all to a “stay of adjudication” or other circumstance 
where the decision may have been in the petitioner’s favor.216 It 
seems contrary to legislative intent to produce a result in which an 
individual who was fully adjudicated may have his or her record at 
least partially restored, but an individual who was not adjudicated 
cannot find relief.217 
 
 214.  See J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Minn. 2013). 
 215.  See Telephone Interview with Jon Geffen, supra note 148 (“Nobody knows 
what’s going on. Even the confusion at the supreme court level was significant. 
People have tried to decipher the decision as it pertains to records, [but it’s 
difficult].”). 
 216.  See State v. C.P.H., 707 N.W.2d 699, 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“In 
determining whether a case was resolved in favor of the petitioner . . . the 
existence of an admission or finding of guilt is the deciding factor.”). 
 217.  A district court judge may use her inherent authority to expunge judicial 
records. See State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1981). However, that 
remedy is limited. When thinking of long-term consequences of an adjudication 
under the J.J.P. ruling, it might make more sense for a juvenile to argue for 
adjudication at the time of charging only so that he or she may qualify for an 
expungement of executive branch records should one be warranted. It is hard to 
believe that this “absurd and unreasonable” result was in fact the intent of the 
majority in deciding to limit J.J.P. to the order of adjudication.  
35
Puechner: No Clean Slates: Unpacking the Complications of Juvenile Expungem
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
2014] JUVENILE EXPUNGEMENTS AFTER J.J.P. 1193 
Individuals who have borne the burden of proof under the 
J.J.P. decision—that their benefit outweighs the burden on the 
courts and public—deserve to be fully restored to the position they 
were in before they were charged. The court has given no clear 
reasoning for the conclusion that those who have rehabilitated 
themselves and shown themselves to be productive members of 
society should carry the burden of having to explain an arrest 
record or miscellaneous court document. When the district court 
has found that a petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated need in 
the areas of education, housing, and employment to the extent that 
the benefit of an expungement would outweigh the burden to the 
courts and public, the petitioner has a right to expect that 
expungement to have a practical effect. The courts, however, have 
gone as far as they can within the current framework of the 
statutory language. Therefore, until the legislature takes action, 
petitioners will continue to face legitimate hardship in the wake of 
the court’s ruling in J.J.P. 
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